The MOA Under OPT

 ...the MOA under OPT...under Ontic pancomputational theism the Modal Ontological Argument would need to have accessibility relations between ontological possible worlds such as string theory worlds or everret worlds as well as between purely conceptual non accessible worlds...under this model the MOA would only need Brouwer and the K distribution axiom to succeed...

One good thing about this model concerns the MOA. Under this model God would be a hyperdimensional intellect. Something analogous to an integrated information network. So, God would be a maximal element and an ontological grounding element. It would be a case of God operating according to an ideal physics which is metaphysically necessary and which interfaces with all metaphysically contingent physics.hence, we would have Omnisubjectivity. God could still be defined as a non physical intellect. If you defined the accessibility relations across worldframes it would be euclidean for possible worlds with ens rational occupying those worlds. In fact anyworld with structure ( informational) would require the prior mind to sustain an experience of it. So, if we can conceive it, God( the prior mind( PM)) would exist eminently in those non ontologically possible but conceptual worlds, even in the empty world since God grounds our conception of it . However, I would not admit conceptual worlds in the MOA framework since there is no ontological accessibility. You would not need S5. The Brouwer and T of K distribution axiom would be sufficient.

The skeptical pushback might be a charge of smuggling in God's existence based on the metaphysical model. I would counter that in any worldframe containing ens rationals, it would be possible there exists a maximal element( Zorn's lemma). Hence, we have a logical entailment that does not beg the question.

..modal ontological argument...John konnor...

1) necessarily if it is not necessarily the case God exists then it is not the case God exists

2) possibly God exists

3) if God exists then it is necessarily the case God exists

C) necessarily it is necessarily the case God exists

Let:

G!= God exists

□(p⊃q)⊃(◇p⊃◇q) Theorem of K.

p⊃□◇p                    Axiom of B.

Proof:

1)□(~□G!⊃~G!)                                   P. 

2)◇G!                                                     P.

3)G!⊃□G!                                               P.

4)□(~□G!⊃~G!)⊃(◇~□G!⊃◇~G!)     T. of K.

5)◇~□G!⊃◇~G!                                   (1,4 MP)

6)~◇~□G!∨◇~G!                                (5 M. Impl.)

7)  □□G!∨◇~G!                                    (6 M.E.)

8)~G!⊃□◇~G!                                       ( I.Ax. of B.)

9)~G!⊃~◇~◇~G!                                 ( 8 M.E.)

10)◇~◇~G!⊃G!                                      (9 Contr.)

11)◇□G!⊃G!                                          (10 M.E.)

12)□(G!⊃□G!)                                       (1 Contr.)

13)□(G!⊃□G!)⊃(◇G!⊃◇□G)               (12 T. of K.)

14)◇G!⊃◇□G!                                      (13,14 MP)

15)◇G!⊃G!                                            (14,11 HS)

16)◇G!⊃□G!                                         (15,3 HS)

17)□G!                                                   (2,16 MMP)

18)~◇~G!                                              (17 M.E.)

19)□□G!                                                (7,18 DS)