A Meinongian Ontological Argument

 ...a meinongian ontological argument...john konnor...


1. for all x if x has conceivable existence and x has exclusive existence in the understanding then x has    conceivable existence in reality


2. for all x if x has exclusive existence in the understanding then x has conceivable existence


3. for all x if x has conceivable existence in reality then x admits of ontological perfectibility


4. for all x either x has exclusive existence in the understanding or x has actual existence


c. God exists


let:

əUx=x has exclusive existence in the understanding

@E!x=x has actual existence

©E!x=x has conceivable existence

©Rx=x has conceivable existence in reality

Ix=x is ontologically imperfectible

the definite description God

g=(℩x)(Ix)

proof:

1. (∀x) (©E!x ∧ əUx)⊃©Rx.                premise

2. (∀x) əUx⊃©E!x.                               premise

3. (∀x ) ©Rx.⊃~Ix.                               premise

4. (∀x )əUx ⊕ @E!x.                            premise

5. əUg⊃©E!g.                                        2UI

6. əUg.                                                    AIP

7. ©E!g.                                                 5,6 MP

8. (©E!g ∧ əUg)⊃©Rg.                        1 UI  

9. ©E!g ∧ əUg.                                     7,6 Conj

10. ©Rg.                                                8,9 MP

11. ©Rg ⊃~Ig.                                       3 UI

12. ~Ig.                                                   10,11 MP

13. (∃x)[((Ix ∧ (∀y)(Iy⊃x=y))∧~Ix)]     12 theory of descriptions

14. (Ia∧ (∀y)(Iy⊃a=y))∧~Ia.                  13 EI

15. ((∀y)(Iy⊃a=y)∧Ia)∧~Ia.                   14 Comm

16. (∀y)(Iy⊃a=y)∧ (Ia∧~Ia)                   15 Assoc

17.  (Ia∧~Ia)                                            16 Simp

18. ~ əUg.                                                6-17 IP

19. əUg ⊕ @E!g.                                    4 UI

20  (əUg.∨ @E!g) ∧ ~(əUg ∧@E!g)       19 Equiv

21.  (əUg.∨ @E!g)                                   20 Simp

22. @E!g.                                                 18,21 DS


 

 Brief Defense of Premises:

Premise 1:


  What premise one is saying is that whatever has conceivable existence has a nature that is not inherently contradictory.  If an object has exclusive existence in the understanding then it can be the subject of epistemic possibility, yet from a two dimensional semantic model such conceivability does not entail possible existence in the actual world.  So, what we are doing with premise one is establishing that objects of mental intentionality have conceivable existence in reality yet this does not entail that such objects can exist or do exist in reality (in actuality).  So, we are not following the category error of a plantinginian sort, by moving from conceivability to existence in reality which the modal ontological argument commits.


Premise 2:


  Premise 2 is reiterating what is being said in Premise1.  Namely, whatever can be the subject of thought does not have an ontological gulf between its sein and its sosein. If an object has a sosein that is  compatible with some type of sein or determination then we say such an object has a determination toward some type of being, hence it is conceivable.  We contrast the determined object with the indeterminable object , the inconceivable object or the object that is impossible yet still conceivable in a thinner non orientable sense , such that it is not conceivable in reality nor any intelligible world such as the roundsquare.


Premise 3:

  Premise 3 is referencing the Meinongian idea of aussersein or the Thomistic real distinction between existence and nature.  If an object is conceivable this means it is merely possible such that it has some potency to be actualized as say when we conceive a statue within a block of marble.  Therefore, God as such according to the definite description cannot be merely possible nor be among those conceivable objects since God is ontologically imperfectible or purus actus.  Hence, God cannot have exclusive existence in the understanding since if we are properly thinking of God according to Anselm proslogion 

2, we would be thinking of existence itself or self subsistent existence.  What is not being said is that God is among those objects that admit of intrinsic contradiction such that its sosein is not compatible with any sort of sein.  God is simply that existent which sosein equals sein or the existent where existence equals nature or essence.


Premise 4:

  Premise 4 is mapping out through exclusive disjunction  the ontological terrain.  Since, God is ontologically imperfectible by nature God cannot exist both in the understanding alone and in reality(actuality). So, this ontological argument cannot be charged with equivocating on existence.  Since, we have already outlined that conceivability in reality does not track onto possible de re existence in reality we are not moving illicitly from de dicto existence to de re existence.  Therefore, since God cannot have exclusive existence in the understanding, God cannot have conceivable existence in real

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