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Mersenne Trademark Argument

 ...mersennes trademark argument modalized...based on maydoles modal model...john konnor... 1. for all x and all y if x is the cause of y's understanding of x then there exists some x which is ontologically supreme 2. for all x and all y either x is the cause of y's understanding of x or there exists a  y that is ontologically perfect c. God exists ie something ontologically supreme let: CxUyx= x is the cause of y's understanding of x Sx= ~◇(∃y)(Gyx)∧ ~◇(∃y)(~x=y ∧ ~Gxy) Py= Iy ∧ ◇(∃y))(Ix ∧ Gyx) ∧ ◇(∃y)(Ix ∧ ~x=y ∧~Gxy) Ix= x is an intellect g= (℩x)~◇(∃y)Gyx proof: 1.  (∀x)(∀y)CxUyx ⊃ (∃x)Sx           premise 2.  (∀x)(∀y)CxUyx ∨ (∃y)Py           premise 3.  Iy ∧ ◇(∃y))(Ix ∧ Gyx) ∧ ◇(∃y)(Ix ∧ ~x=y ∧~Gxy)             Def. of P , AIP 4.   Iy ∧ ◇(∃y))(Ix ∧ Gyx)                3 simp. 5.   ◇(∃y))(Ix ∧ Gyx)  ...

A MOA

 ...MOA...John konnor... 1) it is necessarily possible that God exists 2) if it is necessarily not the case that God exists then it is possible necessary that God does not exist C) God exists Let: G!= God exists 1)□◇G!                         P. 2)□~G!⊃◇□~G!          P. 3)~G!                             AIP 4)□~G!                         3 NI 5)◇□~G!                      2,4 MMP 6)◇~◇~~G!                 5 ME 7)◇~◇G!                       6 DN 8)~◇~◇G!                    1 ME 9)◇~◇G!∧~◇~◇G!     7,8 Conj. 10)G!      ...

Round square copula and the OA

 .... ontological argument from pancomputational universe/ roundsquare copula... john konnor... 1) for all x if x exists only in the mind then x's nature does not encode existence 2) if God does not exist only in the mind then God exists in reality C) God exists M!x: x exists only in the mind. exE!: x's nature encodes existence R!x: x exists in reality g=(ix)exE! 1. (∀x) M!x⊃~exE! 2. ~M!g⊃R!g 3. M!g.   (AiP) 4. Mg⊃~egE! (1UI) 5. ~egE!       (3,4 MP) 6.(∃x)[(exE!∧(∀y)eyE!.⊃    (x=y))∧~exE!]    theory of descriptions 7. (EaE!∧(∀y)eyE!⊃    (x=y))∧~eaE!  6 EI 8. ((∀y)eyE!⊃(a=y)∧eaE)∧~eaE! 7 commutation 9.((∀y)eyE!.⊃(a=y))∧(eaE!∧~eaE!) 8 association 10.(eaE!∧~eaE!) 9 simplification 11.~M!g (3-10 indirect proof) 12. R!g   (2,11 MP) Brief defense: Since the computational universe is a thick abstract tegmarkian math object which can be modeled in phase space, it follows something must be pure concrete existence by n...

A Scotist MOA

 ...a Scotist MOA...John konnor.... 1) either it is necessarily not the case that God exists or necessarily God exists 2) it is not necessarily not the case that God exists C) necessarily God exists Let: G!= God exists Proof: 1)□~G!∨□G!            P 2)~□~G!                   P 3)~~◇~~G!              2, ME 4)◇G!                         4, DN 5)~◇~~G!∨□G!       1, ME 6)~◇G!∨□G!             5, DN 7)◇G!⊃□G!                6, M. Impl. 8)□G!                          4,7 MMP

An MOA

 ...MOA... John Konnor... 1) it is possibly necessarily the case that God exists 2) God exists necessarily Let: G!= God exists Proof: 1)◇□G!                     P 2)~□G!                    AIP 3)□~□G                  NI 4)~◇~~□G!            3, ME 5)~◇□G!                  4, DN 6)~◇□G!∧◇□G!      5,6 Conj.intro. 7)□G!                        2-6, DAIP

An Argument from blackholes to mathematical platonism to OPT

 ...argument for ontic pancomputational theism from mathematical platonism and emergent spacetime... 1) if quantum blackholes are possible then spacetime is fundamentally empirically indeterminate 2) quantum blackholes are possible 3) spacetime is ultimately empirically indeterminate( 1,2 MP) 4) if spacetime is ultimately empirically indeterminate then spacetime is fundamentally nonphysical 5) spacetime is fundamentally nonphysical(3,4 MP) 6) if spacetime is fundamentally nonphysical we should hold to strong ontological skepticism over the commitment to the classification of any physical phenomenon as a concrete experience 7) we should hold to strong ontological skepticism over the commitment to the classification of any physical phenomenon as a concrete experience(5,6 MP) 8) if we should hold to strong ontological skepticism over the commitment to the classification of any physical phenomenon as a concrete experience then we should admit the existence of semantically determinate m...

An Anselmian/Cartesian Argument from Perfection

 ...Anselmian/ Cartesian ontological argument from perfection ...John Konnor... 1) exists a y for all x if y does not exist or x can doubt the existence of y then it is possible x exceeds y in ontological perfection C) God exists Let: DxE!y= x can doubt the existence of y E!x= x has existence Pxy= x exceeds y in ontological perfection g=i(y)~◇(∃x)Pxy Proof: 1)(∃y)(∀x)~E!y∨DxE!y⊃◇Pxy.                 P 2)(∃y)(∀x)~E!y∨DxE!y.                             AIP 3)~E!g∨DaE!g.                                          2, EI, UI 4)~E!g∨DaE!g⊃◇Pag.                             1,EI,UI 5)◇Pag.                              ...